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Between the Prose of Justice and the Poetics of Love?  
Reading Ricœur on Mutual Recognition in the Light of Harmful 
Strategies of “Othering”  
Robert Vosloo 
Stellenbosch University 
Abstract: 
Against the backdrop of the challenges posed by xenophobia and other social phenomena that operated 
with harmful strategies of “othering,” this article considers the promise that the notion of “mutual 
recognition” as exemplified in the later work of Paul Ricœur holds for discourse on these matters. Can the 
hermeneutical and mediating approach of Ricœur provide an adequate framework in order to respond to 
these radical challenges? In light of this question, this article discusses and ultimately affirms Ricœur’s view 
that places mutual recognition between what he calls the prose of justice and the poetics of agápē. In addition 
this article draws attention to the value of symbolic gestures and an ethic of linguistic hospitality to give 
further texture to the plea for mutual recognition amidst experience of exclusion, conflict and violence. 
Keywords: Recognition, Ricœur, Xenophobia, Agape, Linguistic Hospitality. 
Résumé: 
Face aux défis de la xénophobie et des autres phénomènes sociaux liés aux stratégies nuisibles 
“d’altérisation,” cet article réfléchit à la promesse que représente la notion de “reconnaissance mutuelle” 
telle qu’elle se trouve définie dans les derniers travaux de Paul Ricœur. Dans quelle mesure l’approche 
herméneutique de Ricœur et son travail de médiation sont-ils susceptibles de répondre à ces défis radicaux? 
En prenant cette question comme fil conducteur, cet article discute et reprend finalement à son compte la 
thèse de Ricœur selon laquelle la reconnaissance mutuelle se situe entre ce qu’il appelle la “prose” de la 
justice et la “poésie” de l’agapè. L’auteur attire en outre l'attention sur la valeur des gestes symboliques et de 
l’hospitalité ethnique et linguistique susceptibles de donner plus de consistance à l’appel pour la 
reconnaissance mutuelle au sein de cette expérience d’exclusion, de conflit et de violence. 
Mots-clés: Reconnaissance, Ricœur, xénophobie, agapè, hospitalité linguistique. 
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1. Introduction 
In Imagined Liberation: Xenophobia, Citizenship and Identity in South Africa, Germany and 
Canada, sociologists Heribert Adam and Kagilo Moodley argue extensively for the importance of 
political literacy as a strategy to combat xenophobia.1 Using xenophobia as a prism for South 
African society at large, Adam and Moodley traces in their empirical, comparative and theoretical 
study how “the dream of an inclusive, non-racial democracy faded in South Africa” and how 
“the imagined post-apartheid solidarity is being jettisoned.”2 Their study is placed against the 
backdrop of outbreaks of violence against foreigners that occurred in May 2008 in various parts 
of South Africa. Forty-one migrants from other African countries, as well as twenty-one South 
African citizens mistaken for foreigners, were killed and many more injured as agitated mobs 
went on a rampage. Tens of thousands of people sought refuge in churches and police stations. 
These incidents evoked strong critical comments, including from Archbishop emeritus Desmond 
Tutu and former president Nelson Mandela. Since then, frequent incidents of violence and 
hostility against foreigners have become part of the South African social landscape. With this in 
mind, Adam and Moodley comments:  
The popular rage against foreigners contradicts the Mandela/Tutu vision of an inclusive 
‘Rainbow Nation’ and glorious ‘African Renaissance,’ and makes a mockery of the much 
heralded African ‘ubuntu’ philosophy that self-development depends on the well-being 
and care of all other community members. In fact, the ongoing hostility may well be seen 
as a forerunner to an impending civil war between a growing underclass and an 
indifferent, self-enriching state elite.3 
Without going into the detail of Adam and Moodley’s richly textured discussion, it can 
be noted that they argue that, given what they view as the impossibility of effectively controlling 
borders in Africa, one has to take the view that only political education can reduce xenophobia. 
Therefore their plea for a growth in political literacy that does not merely imply “more 
information about the ‘other,’ but basic knowledge of concepts such as ethnocentrism, 
communalism, tribalism, racism, sectarianism, ethnicity, identity, patriotism, nationalism and 
others with which we explain our world and construct meaning.”4 From their interviews with 
students in schools in townships in South Africa, Adam and Moodley points not merely to some 
worrying tendencies that fuels xenophobia, but also to a reservoir of goodwill that holds promise 
for shaping a progressive collective moral mindset that can offer an antidote to the strategies of 
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“othering” that characterises xenophobia. Hence their statement: “If teachers and national leaders 
acknowledge the problem and show the resolve to tackle it, renewed political literacy and other 
interventions that go beyond charity can also improve the situation of migrants in South Africa.”5 
I share the plea for political literacy as a strategy to combat xenophobia put forward by 
Adam and Moodley, even if the challenges might look insurmountable. What is not strongly 
emphasised by Adam and Moodley though are the place of phenomena such as “the gift,” 
“forgiveness,” “love,” “desire,” “sacrifice,” “excess,” “trust,” “reconciliation,” “hospitality,” and 
“recognition” in this discourse, notions which Jan Olav Henriksen has termed “phenomena of 
surplus.”6 In this article I want to ask, therefore, whether programs of political literacy should not 
also include a greater emphasis on the notion of mutual recognition, given the fact that both 
racism and xenophobia have at its heart the posture of non-recognition or misrecognition. Or as 
Charles Taylor puts it in his much-discussed essay on “The Politics of Recognition”:  
The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, if the people around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, 
can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode 
of being.7  
The radical challenges of our time, also those resulting from forced political and 
economic migration, with the concomitant challenges of the quest for just borders, the protections 
of the rights of refugees, and the need for countering xenophobia, invites further reflection on 
notions such as recognition, and also indicates the difficulties of appropriating these notions 
within our public discourse. In this article I consider the notion of “mutual recognition” as 
exemplified in the later work of Paul Ricœur against the backdrop of the challenges posed by 
xenophobia and other social phenomena that operated with harmful strategies of “othering.” Can 
the hermeneutical and mediating approach of Ricœur provide an adequate framework as we seek 
to respond to these radical challenges? In light of this question, this article discusses and 
ultimately affirms Ricœur’s view that places mutual recognition between what he calls the prose 
of justice and the poetics of agape. In addition this article draws attention to the value of symbolic 
gestures and an ethic of linguistic hospitality to give further texture to the plea for mutual 
recognition amidst experience of exclusion, conflict and violence. 
2. Ricœur on Mutual Recognition 
Paul Ricœur addresses explicitly the notion of recognition in his last comprehensive book 
The Course of Recognition.8 In this book, Ricœur – whose interest in this theme went back several 
decades9 – enters into conversation with various occurrences of the term recognition. Following 
his very interesting lexicographical survey of the rule-governed polysemy of the term, he engages 
three philosophical approaches. The first is the Kantian approach, with reference to the way in 
which the term recognitio is used in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. The second 
approach is that of Bergson, with its focus on the recognition of memories. Thirdly, Ricœur 
attends to the Hegelian approach, with its use of the term Anerkennung, dating from Hegel’s Jena 
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period. It is certainly not possible to do justice to Ricœur’s extended discussion of these episodes 
in this article. Despite the danger of over-generalising, one can say that, for Ricœur, Kant is 
concerned with the possibility of objective knowledge. In Bergson’s case the focus is on the age-
old question of the relationship between body and soul, paired with the question of the 
recognition of memories. And with Hegel it is about the struggle for recognition, the demand for 
recognition. Ricœur provides a nuanced discussion of the possible interconnections as well as 
differences between Kantian recognitio, Bergsonian recognition, and Hegelian and post-Hegelian 
Anerkennung.  
2.1 Mutual Recognition and the Challenge Posed by Hobbes 
In this article I am particularly interested in Ricœur’s discussion of mutual recognition in 
The Course of Recognition, especially as it builds on Hegel’s understanding of Anerkennung as a 
response to Hobbes’s challenge that the state of nature is a “war of all against all,” with its 
passions of competition, mistrust and glory. Following his reading of Hegel, Ricœur also draws 
extensively on Alex Honneth systematic renewal of the theme of Anerkennung in Honneth’s 
important book Kampf um Anerkennung.10 Ricœur, moreover, also raises some critical question 
regarding the very idea of a struggle for recognition, since the demand for recognition can also be 
misused for narrow ethnocentric agendas that can fuel violence. Ricœur seems to be aware of the 
possible problems that can besiege the struggle for recognition, therefore his thesis “that the 
struggle for recognition would lose itself in the unhappy consciousness if it were not given to 
humans to be able to accede to an actual, albeit symbolic, experience of mutual recognition, 
following the model of the reciprocal ceremonial gift.”11  
For Ricœur the theme of Anerkennung provides a moral rejoinder to the challenge posed 
by what he calls a “naturalistic interpretation of the sources of the political.”12 In this regard 
Ricœur focuses in his reading of Hobbes’ Leviathan not so much on Hobbes’ theory of the state, 
but on his theory of the “state of nature,” in light of the question whether a foundational moral 
motive underlies our life together, our “being-with” or “being-amongst” others. Ricœur refers to 
Hobbes’ description of the state of nature as a “war of all against all,” with its three primitive 
passions of competition, distrust (or diffidence), and glory, which makes that humans invade for 
the sake of gain, safety or reputation respectively.13 The challenge posed by Hobbes can be 
summarized for Ricœur in the question: Can a political order be founded on a moral concept that 
is as foundational as the fear of a violent death in the “war of all against all”? Ricœur notes that 
for Hegel, in his response to the challenge posed by Hobbes, the answer lies in the concept of 
Anerkennung. The desire to be recognized can confront the fear of a violent death.  
Of special concern for the argument of this article is the way in which Ricœur further 
draws and comments on Axel Honneth’s important work The Struggle for Recognition.14 According 
to Ricœur, Honneth systematic renewal of Hegel’s argument entails that the struggle for 
recognition (as rejoinder to Hobbes) proceeds from moral motives that can challenge the triad of 
competition, distrust and glory. In his reconstruction of Hegel’s Jena writings (offered as part of a 
renewal of Hegel), Honneth develops the idea of an interconnected sequence of three models of 
intersubjective recognition under the scope of – respectively – love, law and social esteem. The 
first model of recognition, namely love, includes the strong emotional attachments among a small 
group of people, such as erotic relations, friendship and family ties. This requires a degree of 
reciprocal recognition. The second model of recognition, namely law, functions on the juridical 
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plane. The third model of mutual recognition relates to social esteem, and it is on this plane that 
‘ethical life’ reveals itself as irreducible to juridical views.15 
2.2 The Struggle for Recognition and States of Peace 
In The Course of Recognition Ricœur discusses, in conversation with Honneth, what he 
terms “new subjective capacities” in the struggle for recognition such as self-confidence, respect 
and self-esteem. Yet Ricœur also registers some uneasiness with some of the claims associated 
with the idea of a “struggle.” Hence his important question: “When […] does a subject deem him- 
or herself to be truly recognized?”16 Or to quote his more pointed question and comment:  
Does not the claim for affective, juridical, and social recognition, through its militant, 
conflictual style, end up as an infinite demand, a kind of ‘bad infinity’? This question has 
to do not only with the negative feelings that go with a lack of recognition, but also with 
the acquired abilities, thereby handed over to an insatiable quest. The temptation here is a 
new form of the ‘unhappy consciousness,’ as either an incurable sense of victimization or 
the indefatigable postulation of unattainable ideals.17 
One can imagine several responses to this remark by Ricœur. One can ask, for instance, 
questions such as: Is this not a typical remark by a white, male, heterosexual Protestant European 
who speaks from a position of privilege? Is not a critique of the idea of struggle in the phrase 
“struggle for recognition” in itself a misrecognition of the concrete and painful experiences of 
non-recognition and misrecognition that form part of the lives of millions of people on a daily 
basis? And: Does this question of Ricœur display the necessary sensitivity towards those people 
in our global world that experiences on a daily level what Enrique Dussel described as the 
“underside of Modernity”?18 
One should indeed not underestimate the powers that sustain misrecognition and makes 
the continual vigilance and struggle against injustice in our global world necessary today. Axel 
Honneth too has expressed some misgivings with Ricœur’s critique of the term “struggle” in the 
phrase “the struggle for recognition.” In an interview with Gonçalo Marcelo, Honneth comments:  
When I was reading Ricœur I was surprised that he seemed to take struggle as being 
something very close to war […] I take struggle as being an enormously productive force 
in our human life-world. And it takes a thousand of forms […] It slowly changes the way 
we understand the principles of recognition, the way we understand ourselves, and 
slowly helps to make our societies normatively better.19  
Honneth also addresses Ricœur’s reference to “bad infinity” in his critical question, and 
argues for what he calls “productive infinity”:  
I contend that these forms of recognition – be it equality, be it love – have a normative 
surplus, and inbuilt normative demand, that we will never be able to institutionalize. But 
this means that we have a permanent demand imposed on ourselves, a demand to makes 
things better. The systematic point is that Ricœur believes that we should think of 
recognition as a one-sided act of grace – something like a gift – whereas I think that this is 
what comes second. I would always put reciprocal forms of recognition first.20 
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These remarks by Honneth illuminate a possible difference between him and Ricœur 
with regard to mutual recognition, a difference that hinges on their respective understanding of 
reciprocity. It should be noted though that Ricœur’s view is not a naïve view of a struggle-free 
quest for recognition, but it does critically interrogate a wholly positive reading of the struggle 
for recognition.  
2.3 Symbolic Mutual Recognition Between Justice and Agape 
Notwithstanding Honneth’s reservations, the force of the question posed by Ricœur 
remains: When does a subject deems him- or herself truly recognized. Ricœur’s discussion in 
light of this question warrants further explication. So let us consider his thesis:  
The alternative to the idea of struggle in the process of mutual recognition is to be sought 
in peaceful experiences of mutual recognition, based on symbolic mediations as exempt 
from the juridical as from the commercial order of exchange.21  
Ricœur calls attention to the fact that models of these “peaceful experiences” or “states of 
peace” exist in our culture, known by their Greek names as philia (in the Aristotelian sense), eros 
(in the Platonic sense) and agape (in the biblical and post-biblical sense). Ricœur is especially 
interested in the notion of agape where the notion of gift-giving seemingly does not require nor 
expect a gift in return, thereby challenging the idea of reciprocity associated with circularity.22  
The question arises, however, how do we relate agape to justice? Ricœur has of course 
written much on the notion of justice,23 and on the relation between love and justice.24 And in The 
Course of Recognition he draws on his earlier work on the relationship between justice and love, 
this time placing it within the framework of his discussion of mutual recognition. Ricœur does 
not want to separate agape as a state of peace from justice, albeit that he makes it clear that “it is 
first in contrast to justice that agape presents in credentials.”25 The credibility for talk about 
agape, Ricœur notes, lies in the dialectic of love and justice. Agape is in some ways 
incommensurable with justice in the way that it enters into language. The discourse of agape is 
that of praise, following the model of Paul’s well-known hymn to love in 1 Corinthians 13.26 The 
imperative “Love me!” has a poetic usage akin to that of the hymn or the benediction. Or as 
Ricœur puts it: “agape declares itself; justice makes arguments.”27 Moreover, Ricœur’s discussion 
of the dialectic between love and justice is not merely interested in indicating difference; rather, 
the central concern is about their interconnectedness. Hence his crucial question: “Can we build a 
bridge between the poetics of agape and the prose of justice, between the hymn and the formal 
rule?”28 For Ricœur this bridge must be built, since both justice and agape resides in the same 
world of action.  
What is of central importance here is Ricœur’s use of the notion of symbolic mutual 
recognition in his discussion of the gift exchange (inspired by the ground-breaking work of 
Marcel Mauss). In his development of this idea of symbolic mutual recognition Ricœur further 
draws on the work of Marcel Hénaff. Ricœur writes:  
What is revolutionary about Hénaff’s proposal is that the shifts the emphasis from the 
relation between giver and recipient to seek the key to our enigma in the very mutuality of 
the exchange ‘between’ the protagonists, calling the shared operation mutual recognition. 
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The initial enigma of a force supposed to reside in the object itself is dissipated if we take 
the thing given and returned as the pledge of and substitute of recognition. It is a pledge 
of the giver’s commitment through the gift and a substitute for the trust that this gesture 
will be reciprocated.29  
Ricœur adds that one can view this relationship of mutuality as a form of recognition that 
does not recognise itself, to the extent that it is more interested in the gesture than in the words, 
thus the relationship symbolizes itself as a gift.30 This does not mean, however, the end of conflict, 
and the process of discerning between good and bad reciprocity remains. In this regard the 
notion of gratitude plays an important role for Ricœur: “A good receiving depends on gratitude 
which is the soul of the division between good and bad reciprocity.”31 
In short: Ricœur argues in his discussion of mutual recognition that in the exchange of 
gifts social partners can experience symbolic but actual recognition. Yet, we should note that for 
Ricœur “states of peace” through symbolic recognition are temporary truces, often a suspension 
of the dispute, a mere clearing in the forest of perplexities. Although these “states of peace” 
function within the horizon of hope, the creative tension between generosity and obligation, 
between love and justice, remains. Hence his remark: 
The struggle for recognition perhaps remains endless. At the very least, the experiences of 
actual recognition in the exchange of gifts, principally in their festive character, confer on 
the struggle for recognition the assurance that the motivation which distinguishes form 
the lust for power and shelters it from the fascination of violence is neither illusionary nor 
vain.32 
3. Political Literacy, Gestures, and Linguistic Hospitality 
In the Introduction to this article, I referred to the work by Adam and Moodley on 
xenophobia, citizenship and identity, and their emphasis on political literacy as strategy to 
combat xenophobia and racism.33 Political literacy – which functions within the framework of 
human dignity, equality and social justice – refers for them to the skills of inquiry needed to 
understand the ways in which power and institutions function in social contexts. In addition it 
focuses on understanding social conflict (and its causes) and the nature of dissent. Political 
literacy is about developing the skills to stay informed about current events, with as underlying 
goal “to engage in transformative actions by shaping democracy through the use of well-
formulated, reasoned argument.”34 Adam and Moodley further challenges what they call “an 
apolitical consumerism that privatises the public realm while denigrating the public sphere,” 
since it is unable to grasp the political significance of racism or provide the resources to envision 
alternatives that could move beyond stigmatisation.35  
Without going into the detail of their discussion, I want to affirm their plea for political 
literacy as a strategy to challenge racism and xenophobia, also in post-apartheid South Africa. It 
is the wager of this article that Ricœur’s work on mutual recognition holds much promise for the 
continuing reflection on political literacy, also within contexts of social conflict and violence. The 
strength of Ricœur’s discussion of mutual recognition lies in the fact that he interrogates the 
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conflictual nature of the struggle for recognition with the telos of peace in mind. In the process 
phenomena of surplus, such as hospitality and recognition, receive their rightful emphasis.  
In the editorial introduction to the essays collected in the book Phenomenologies of the 
Stranger: Between Hostility and Hospitality, Richard Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch writes: “We 
belong to nations and cultures embroiled in debates about borders, immigration, and cultural 
assimilation. Our world calls on us to improve our capacity to respond responsibly: to learn to 
offer hospitality or to assess hostility.”36 The persistence of racism, the continuing outbreaks of 
xenophobia, and the hardening of a xenophobic mindset, poses great challenges to the social 
fabric of the South African society. The potential for conflict and violence amidst vast poverty, 
unemployment, and social and economic inequality indeed calls for the improvement of the 
capacity to respond responsibly, to assess hostility and learn to offer hospitality. The argument of 
this article is therefore that also in the response to the radical challenges posed in our time by 
racism and xenophobia we need a “thicker” moral language that does not minimalize the surplus 
meaning of notions like recognition and hospitality but places it, to use Ricœur’s words, between 
the prose of justice and the agape of love. 
With this in mind, I want to highlight two further aspects emphasised in the work of 
Ricœur that seems to me pertinent for a discussion on mutual recognition, also in the light of the 
realities associated with racism and xenophobia. More precisely, the promise of a Ricœurian 
understanding of mutual recognition for addressing publicly some of the challenges posed by 
polarization in our globalizing world hinges on these aspects. A first aspect relates to Ricœur’s 
understanding of symbolic mutual recognition and especially the emphasis on the importance of 
gestures. In his discussion of forgiveness in the epilogue of his monumental work Memory, 
History, Forgetting, as well as in some other writings on this topic, Ricœur also alludes to the 
importance of gestures that cannot be transformed into institutions to assure some form of 
“normality” amidst conflict, also within the friend-enemy relationship.37 In his lecture “The 
Difficulty to Forgive,” Ricœur, for instance, writes: “Then what would the more specific marks of 
forgiveness be behind the mask of normality? I would lay the stress on certain gestures, such as 
that of Willy Brandt kneeling at the foot of the Jewish memorial in Poland, or the handshake 
between Rabin and Arafat, following that between Sadat and Begin.”38 Symbolic gestures – also 
those associated with mutual recognition – are of course open to misinterpretation and abuse; yet 
there potential to be in service of states of peace amidst conflict, polarization and violence should 
not be underestimated.  
In The Course of Recognition, in his discussion of gift exchanges and mutual recognition, 
Ricœur writes that such gestures “cannot become an institution, yet by bringing to light the limits 
of the justice of equivalence, and opening space for hope at the horizon of politics on the post-
national and international level, they unleash an irradiating and irrigating peace.”39 The festive 
character of the gift, as a gesture, is for Ricœur comparable to the hymn or other optative modes 
of language on the verbal plane. Such gestures require that one is attuned to what Ricœur refers 
to as the poetics of love.  
A second aspect in Ricœur’s later work that holds promise for the further development of 
an ethics and politics of mutual (symbolic) recognition is the emphasis on what he calls 
“linguistic hospitality.” This notion feature prominently in some of the essays published in 2004 
under the title Sur la traduction (and in English in 2006 under the title On Translation). Towards 
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the end of the essay “Translation as Challenge and Source of Happiness,” Ricœur, for instance, 
links the translator’s task to linguistic hospitality:  
(J)ust as in the act of telling a story, we can translate differently, without filling the gap 
between equivalence and total adequacy. Linguistic hospitality, then, where the pleasure 
of dwelling in the other’s language is balanced by the pleasure of receiving the foreign 
word at home, in one’s own welcoming house.40  
And in the essay on “The Paradigm of Translation” Ricœur writes:  
Bringing the reader to the author, bringing the author to the reader, at the risk of serving 
and of betraying two masters: this is to practice what I call linguistic hospitality. It is this 
that serves as model for other forms of hospitality that I think resemble it.41  
This emphasis on linguistic hospitality can serve as model for other forms of hospitality 
as well, including for life together with the strangers and foreigners that speak a different 
language, also a different moral and religious language. We should also take into account in this 
regard a remark by Ricœur towards the end of this essay:  
And then, without the test of the foreign, would we be sensitive to the strangeness of our 
own language […] would we not in danger of shutting ourselves in the sourness of a 
monologue, alone with our books? Credit, then to linguistic hospitality.42  
Commenting on Ricœur’s philosophy of translation and its emphasis on alterity and our 
interwoven stories and histories, Richard Kearney even writes in the Introduction to On 
Translation:  
Ricœur goes so far as to suggest that the future ethos of European politics, and eventually 
of world politics, should be one based on exchange of memories and narratives between 
different nations, for it is only when we translate our own wounds into the language of 
strangers and retranslate the wounds of strangers into our own language that healing and 
reconciliation can take place.43 
4. Conclusion: In Defence of the “Between” 
In the call for papers to a conference in 2014 in Antwerpen on the theme “Paul Ricœur: 
Thinker on the Margins?” the point was made that Paul Ricœur is a dialogical and dialectic 
philosopher that is committed to mediate between conflicting philosophers and streams of 
thought, hence the frequency of the phrase “between” in the titles, headings, and body of his 
writings.44 The question is also asked whether this “thinker of the between” can appropriate the 
radicalness of certain insights, and thus hear more radical voices that resist easy synthesis. This 
legitimate question becomes pertinent in the current discourse on racism and xenophobia, which 
is also part of a broader discourse on migration, displacement, and economic inequality and 
injustice. In this article I indicated the promise of Ricœur’s emphasis that the struggle for 
recognition should be sought in peaceful experiences of mutual recognition based on symbolic 
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mediations, emphasising in the process the need to build a bridge between juridical and symbolic 
recognition, between the prose of justice and the poetics of love.45  
Yet as a counter-argument one can state that Ricœur’s hesitation to appropriate fully the 
language of “struggle” and a strict emphasis on justice as equivalence, and seeking the “between” 
(between self and other, between love and justice), is less helpful for some of the justice quests of 
our age. Might it not be that these quests require a more radical emphasis on the recognition of 
one’s own identity or that of a specific group, or a more conflictual and even militant struggle for 
just retribution, restitution and re-distribution? The force of these questions must be given its due 
consideration. One could, moreover, also draw upon Ricœur’s own hermeneutic philosophy to 
emphasise the need for discernment, in order to read the sign of the time, and to act accordingly. 
This process of discernment, I would like to argue, does not entail a suspension of mediation and 
hermeneutics, although it does point to a form of decision and action that follows from the 
struggle to find one’s voice and stance between the prose of justice and the poetics of love. The 
challenged posed by conflict and violence, also amidst harmful strategies of “othering” such as 
racism and xenophobia, therefore calls for a passionate defence (and not a suspension) of the 
Ricœurian emphasis on the “between.” 
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